In recent days, political and expert circles in Armenia have once again placed at the top of the agenda discussions on holding a referendum on constitutional amendments, reportedly demanded by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, as well as a referendum on EU–EAEU membership, reportedly sought by Russian President Vladimir Putin.  Following the elections, however, the new political landscape makes holding such a referendum a particularly serious and politically sensitive issue for the current authorities. The matter is that, under Article 202 of Armenia’s Constitutional Law “On Referendum,” if an entirely new draft Constitution is put to a referendum, or amendments are proposed to the Constitution’s fundamental and unamendable provisions (Chapters 1–3, 7, 10 and 15, as well as a number of other key articles), the decision to submit the draft to a referendum must be approved by at least two-thirds of the total number of members of the National Assembly. Another provision, Article 205 of the Armenian Constitution, further stipulates that Armenia’s membership in supranational organizations must be decided by referendum, requiring approval by a majority of the total number of members of the National Assembly. 

However, in the newly formed parliament, the ruling Civil Contract faction does not control two-thirds of the seats and therefore lacks a constitutional majority. This creates a new and challenging legal and political situation for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s team, particularly with regard to constitutional amendments and the possibility of holding a referendum on EU–EAEU membership. It is clear that, acting alone and without the support of other parliamentary forces or individual MPs, the ruling party no longer has the legal ability to initiate a constitutional referendum. 

According to statements from the authorities, the lack of a constitutional majority will not deter them from pursuing their agenda of constitutional change. If the necessary parliamentary support cannot be secured, they have indicated that they may resort to alternative means, without specifying what those might be.  

The parliamentary opposition, for its part—particularly the Armenia Alliance—has declared that constitutional change is a red line for them, and that its parliamentary faction will not support Pashinyan’s team in putting a new Constitution to a referendum.

However, while the Armenian authorities remain prepared to pursue a referendum on constitutional amendments, they have taken a much firmer stance on the EU–EAEU referendum being pushed by Russia. The prime minister himself recently stated that Armenia cannot be forced to hold such a referendum and that the issue is not yet sufficiently mature.

We spoke to Armenian political strategists to explore what scenarios might unfold and what mechanisms the authorities could use to push the referendum agenda forward without the necessary constitutional majority in parliament.

Suren Surenyants: Pashinyan May Turn to Snap Elections if He Fails to Secure the Necessary Votes

Speaking to Caucasus Watch, political scientist Suren Surenyants said voters had clearly not given the authorities a mandate to change the Constitution. He also ruled out any MP from the Armenia Alliance supporting the government’s agenda, regardless of pressure from the authorities, while expressing uncertainty about MPs from the other opposition faction, Strong Armenia. 

“I know all the MPs from the Armenia Alliance. Most are experienced politicians who have developed a certain resilience to pressure. I would like to have the same confidence in Strong Armenia, but I am not familiar enough with many of its members to say so with the same certainty,” the political scientist said.

Surenyants also rules out any alternative mechanism, stressing that the Constitution unequivocally requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority to amend it. “This cannot be done through the Law on Referendum or by collecting signatures. That option simply does not apply here,” he said.

Political scientist Suren Surenyants argues that, as a matter of principle, Armenia’s Constitution should not be changed at the behest of a foreign state. He also opposes removing the reference to the Declaration of Independence, adopted in a specific historical context when self-determination was tied to the goal of unification. At the same time, he acknowledges that countries defeated in war may be compelled to make certain changes. 

“The Declaration reflected the aspirations of the Armenian people and our national goals at the time. In my view, it should not be tampered with, especially since the reference appears in the preamble rather than the substantive provisions of the Constitution and therefore has no direct constitutional-legal effect. I also understand the consequences of the war and recognize that, regardless of Nikol Pashinyan’s negotiating skills, an opposing state may make such a demand.”

As an alternative, Surenyants suggests adding a constitutional provision stating that Armenia has no territorial claims against any country, thereby addressing concerns raised by Azerbaijan and others without removing the reference to the Declaration of Independence. He argues that such a provision would have constitutional-legal effect once enshrined in the Constitution.

Surenyants does not expect a referendum on constitutional amendments before next summer.

 “I believe Nikol Pashinyan does not dare to hold it at this stage. Having failed to secure the six MPs needed for a two-thirds majority, he may now seek to create a political environment through repressive measures that would allow him to meet the external demand. If he still fails to secure their support, I think he will pursue the dissolution of parliament and hold snap elections.”

EU–EAEU Referendum: Can Armenia Avoid a Politically Risky Choice?

Regarding Russia’s demand for an EAEU–EU referendum, Surenyants argues that it sets a troubling institutional precedent: foreign states can bypass the Armenian government and appeal directly to the public, undermining the government’s credibility. He sees this as a highly concerning development and a sharp decline in Armenia’s subjectivity. 

“The referendum demanded by Russia is simply a tool of pressure on Armenia. In this case, however, ‘pressure’ should not be understood in a negative sense. Russia is making a straightforward point: Armenia cannot belong to two different customs regimes and must choose. If Armenia genuinely wants to leave the EAEU, it can take that step and withdraw without holding a referendum. At the same time, if Armenia wants to reassure Russia that it has no intention of doing so, it would be enough to repeal the law adopted by the National Assembly in 2025 on launching the process of Armenia’s accession to the European Union. I believe there are still ways to resolve this issue before a referendum. Such a vote could have far-reaching consequences for Armenia, as Nikol Pashinyan’s strategic policy shift is based on little evidence and lacks adequate calculation. This is such a sensitive issue that even Armenian society remains divided. While anti-Russian sentiment has grown, Russia has also contributed to it through actions and positions that, to put it mildly, have been controversial. Before taking such a fateful step, any government has a responsibility to explain to its people the social, economic, and security consequences of such a policy decision,” the political scientist argues.

 Surenyants rules out combining the constitutional and EAEU–EU questions in a single referendum and doubts that the latter will ever be held. However, he does not rule out the authorities circumventing the constitutional requirement for a referendum on membership in a supranational organization, which requires approval by a majority of the National Assembly, and putting the EAEU–EU question to a vote if they deem it necessary. 

“They may argue that winning a majority gives us the mandate to do this. But a governing mandate cannot be confused with undermining the constitutional order. A party’s mandate extends only to the powers granted by the Constitution and the law. Yet the authorities are blatantly abusing the mandate they received from the people. Although Nikol Pashinyan had hinted that failing to secure a two-thirds majority—and thus being unable to amend the Constitution—would lead to war in September, voters did not believe the threat. They denied him the two-thirds majority, giving him instead a mandate to form a government, which I do not dispute,” Suren Surenyants concluded.

Gagik Kamalyan: Constitutional Reform Is a Medium-Term Political Task

Speaking to us, political commentator and analyst Gagik Kamalyan largely ruled out the possibility that the authorities would seek the opposition’s support to secure a parliamentary vote on holding a referendum on constitutional amendments.

“That would be a politically short-sighted and difficult-to-implement step on the part of the authorities. As for whether there could hypothetically be opposition MPs who might support the authorities, that possibility cannot be ruled out. The question, however, is when this could happen, and that would depend on the timeframe within which the Armenian authorities seek to resolve the issue of constitutional amendments. If the authorities are looking to resolve the issue in the short term, then that would be unlikely. But if they are looking at a medium- or long-term timeframe—over the next two or three years—it is quite possible that they could take that step. I don’t think the constitutional amendment issue can be left for the long term. I wouldn’t call it particularly urgent, but it certainly needs to be resolved at least in the medium term. In that case, it seems to me that the political decision has already been made to amend the Constitution; what remains is to work out the legal framework. As for what the experts and lawyers advising the authorities will ultimately decide from a professional standpoint, I cannot say. In any case, it is clear that some processes are already underway in this direction. “It is still at the stage of political deliberation, and we cannot yet say for certain what choice the authorities will ultimately face,” the political commentator concludes. 

European Integration and EU Membership Are Two Different Things

In response to our question as to whether a referendum on EAEU–EU membership is likely to be held in the near future, and how this could be done without the required two-thirds majority, Gagik Kamalyan said:

“The most interesting thing is that there is a widespread misconception in Armenian political expert circles about what EU membership actually entails. The EU does not seek to bring countries into its fold; rather, it is the countries themselves that aspire to join the Union. And becoming an EU member is a lengthy process, particularly for societies in former Soviet republics like ours. Russia understands very well that this is not something that can be done in the short or medium term. The necessary legal framework is not yet in place, and, more importantly, you cannot hold a referendum on something that does not yet exist. Nevertheless, Russia is keeping the issue on the agenda in an effort to put pressure on the Armenian authorities. The Armenian government, however, has refused to make it part of its own agenda—and rightly so. That is the crux of the matter. Adopting European standards and bringing the country into line with them is one thing; making a political decision to join the EU is quite another. In that regard, I think Russia will try to put the issue on the agenda in the coming months, while the Armenian authorities will resist and refuse to make it part of the political agenda.”

Russia’s Military Base in Armenia: A New Tool for Stirring Domestic Political Tensions

According to Gagik Kamalyan, Russia may use other levers of pressure, as reflected in Putin’s latest press conference in Bishkek, where the EU issue took a back seat to the Russian military base in Armenia. 

“What is particularly interesting is that Putin raised the issue of withdrawing the Russian military base after meeting Erdoğan in Bishkek. He could hardly have done so without discussing it with Erdoğan first. I’m not going to venture into conspiracy theories, but this is certainly something to bear in mind. This is not on the agenda either, as the Armenian authorities have made no such demand. However, many in Armenian society dissatisfied with Russia have been asking for years: what does Armenia need Russia for? Political scientists and politicians have raised this issue as well. I have argued that the Russian military base need not be withdrawn immediately; rather, Armenia should work toward reducing its dependence on it. If we want the base to lose its influence over our domestic and regional affairs, we must reduce its strategic importance—and that is possible only through peace and stability in the region. The Armenian authorities’ policy toward Turkey and Azerbaijan is aimed at reducing Russian influence and could ultimately weaken the role of the Russian military base as well. Putin understands this and is now seeking to fuel political tensions in Armenia. Pro-Russian forces are already echoing the familiar narrative that without Russia’s military base, Armenia would face an existential threat and Turkey would destroy the country—claims that have been fed to Armenian society for decades. But we should consider the realities on the ground: Russia’s four-year war against Ukraine has significantly weakened it both militarily and economically. It is difficult to imagine Russia being weaker than it is today, either in recent years or over the coming decade. If Turkey’s agenda were truly to destroy Armenia, it would hardly have a more favorable opportunity than now. Yet I do not believe Russia could open a second front in the Caucasus and go to war with Turkey. The logical conclusion is that destroying Armenia is not currently part of Turkey’s agenda. Despite elements of Islamism, Turkey remains firmly within the Western bloc, particularly in military and security terms. The United States remains Turkey’s key global security ally, a reality Ankara understands and takes into account. Meanwhile, through the TRIPP project and the August 8 declaration, Washington has expanded its presence in the region both politically and economically, with American capital already flowing into Armenia, particularly the high-tech sector. Turkey is well aware of this and is unlikely to take such a step now or over the next 10–20 years. That is why Putin’s talk of withdrawing the Russian military base now carries little weight as a tool for stirring domestic political tensions in Armenia. Putin himself often appears disconnected from reality, still operating within Cold War—and even imperial Russian—narratives. As a result, he seems to be losing ground on all fronts. China’s influence in Central Asia is steadily growing, while Central Asian countries are seeking to position themselves as a bridge between the West and China. Against this backdrop, the South Caucasus is becoming increasingly important—a reality that needs to be acknowledged,” Gagik Kamalyan concludes.

Tevan Poghosyan: Pressure on Opposition MPs Could Shape the Referendum Debate

Unlike our previous interlocutors, political scientist and public policy expert Tevan Poghosyan questioned the democratic credentials of Armenia’s current authorities and did not rule out their use of force against opposition MPs, which he says is already happening on a daily basis. 

“A government that has rigged elections and is now engaged in repression has no red lines and can resort to pressure tactics. We saw similar cases in the previous parliament, when opposition MPs either buckled under pressure or were persuaded by other incentives”.

As for putting the issue to a referendum through other mechanisms, including by collecting signatures, Tevan Poghosyan argues that the law still requires the proposal to be brought before the National Assembly and put to a vote.

“But I would not rule out the authorities acting outside the law. Within the framework of law and democracy, no—but outside it, they will try anything. They have proven this repeatedly,” Poghosyan insists.

Tevan Poghosyan offered the following explanation for Russia’s push for a referendum on Armenia’s EU–EAEU orientation:

“Russia is seeking to advance its own interests, and rather than applying pressure, it is presenting the issue as a democratic choice, saying: put it to a referendum. This approach is entirely in line with the interests of powerful states. Ultimately, it is the Armenian people who should decide. Meanwhile, the goals and agenda of the current authorities remain unclear.”

Tevan Poghosyan also did not rule out the possibility of addressing both issues—the choice between the EAEU and the EU and constitutional reform—within the framework of a single referendum.

“Everything will depend on how developments unfold, and it is difficult to put a specific timeframe on it. But the key point is this: even if you decide which direction you want to take, will that side necessarily be willing to accept you? The only certainty is that the EU currently has no agenda for Armenia’s membership,” the political scientist concluded.

Contributed by Anna Vardanyan, an Armenian political journalist and researcher with over 18 years’ experience in defence policy, international relations, and security in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, has worked for Armenian media and held advisory roles in the National Assembly of Armenia.