To what extent will the TRIPP corridor reduce Georgia’s significance as a logistics hub in the Caucasus and Central Asia? This is partly a political question, as the region is emerging as a central transit zone in Eurasia. The discussion is especially relevant as Georgia appears to be shifting from a Chinese-led consortium to a state-owned model for developing the Anaklia Deep Sea Port, still considered central to Georgia’s role as the main gateway for Central Asia and the Caucasus to the Black Sea and onward to South and Central Eastern Europe.

To explore Georgia’s geoeconomic position, Caucasus Watch turns to Lasha Amashukeli, Vice President of Lydeoil, a company specialising in petroleum trading—a commodity of increasing strategic importance as the U.S. attack on Iran and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine place pressure on supply chains. As the bottleneck between Türkiye, Armenia and Azerbaijan begins to ease, we discuss Georgia’s relevance for the Middle Corridor, much of which hinges on delivering the Anaklia Deep Sea Port.

To what extent does Georgia remain relevant to the Middle Corridor, particularly following the TRIPP Agreement?

Georgia remains highly relevant to the Middle Corridor, although the regional landscape is becoming more competitive and diversified following the TRIPP Agreement. This competition is positive for Georgia. It creates pressure to improve infrastructure, services and efficiency. Georgia cannot assume its current position will remain unchallenged, and this dynamic is healthy for the corridor.

Georgia is already responding. The country plans approximately USD 7 billion in strategic transport and logistics infrastructure investment by 2032, including Anaklia, Georgian Railway modernisation and major highway projects. Georgian Railway is undergoing a modernisation programme of more than GEL 1 billion (USD 383 million), aimed at improving infrastructure, rolling stock, operational efficiency and capacity.

Cargo flows are rising. In January–April 2026, Georgian seaports and terminals handled approximately 5.95 million tonnes, up 21% year-on-year, while container handling increased 8% to 258,583 TEU. During January–May 2026, cargo on the Middle Corridor through Georgia increased by roughly 21%, and vessel tonnage entering Georgian ports rose by 19%. TRIPP should not be viewed solely as a threat. It creates an additional connectivity option and can stimulate further investment and efficiency across the South Caucasus.

There is also a distinction between creating an alternative route and replacing an established logistics ecosystem. Georgia already has operating Black Sea ports, railway infrastructure, road networks, customs systems, logistics operators and established cargo flows. TRIPP may compete for specific cargo, but this does not make the Georgian route redundant. Shippers will decide. They will compare total cost, transit time, reliability, capacity, customs procedures and schedule predictability. This is why I see the future less as substitution and more as layering. Multiple routes can compete while overall regional volumes continue to grow.

When you note a surge in volumes handled by Georgian logistics operators, what kind of cargo are you referring to? What trade links can Georgia facilitate?

When discussing the Middle Corridor, attention often focuses on Euro–China trade. Last year, of the five million tonnes handled through the Middle Corridor, only one million moved between Europe and China. Most trade was between countries along the Corridor, from Türkiye to Central Asia and vice versa. Much of the surge through Georgia involved fertilisers—driven by rising demand due to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz—as well as iron beams and other metal alloys, some of which are exported to China.

The cost of the Middle Corridor remains high, not least because it is multimodal. How scalable is the project given the current security situation in the Black Sea?

The multimodal nature of the Middle Corridor is one of its structural challenges. Each transfer between rail, road and sea adds handling, coordination, documentation and cost. At the same time, multimodality is not only a weakness. It provides diversification and resilience. In the current geopolitical environment, companies are increasingly willing to pay a premium for an alternative route if it reduces dependence on a single corridor.

The key question is whether the Middle Corridor can reduce that premium over time through scale, better coordination and more predictable operations. Black Sea security is an important risk factor, particularly for shipping insurance and schedule reliability. But I would distinguish between the existence of security risks and the scalability of the corridor.

The Middle Corridor does not need to become the cheapest Eurasian route for every cargo. It needs to be sufficiently reliable, predictable and commercially competitive for shippers to use it at scale. Growing cargo volumes suggest the market is already testing this proposition. Georgia’s transport infrastructure is therefore not simply defending an existing position; it is being developed against a backdrop of rising regional demand.

Can this multimodal corridor address the challenge of scalability? With a war in Iran and the bombing of Novorossiysk, one would expect the Middle Corridor to emerge as a key conduit for oil and gas. Yet the ability to transit such resources is limited by existing infrastructure.

These changes will not happen overnight. The flow of crude has already surged, and increasing volumes will reduce costs. It is a better option than a route that can be bombed. Shipments under low-risk insurance that bypass Novorossiysk will become more attractive. I do not see Novorossiysk recovering traffic soon, as no one wants to risk their vessels if they can avoid it.

So, who invests in Georgian logistics? Where are the investors from?

Currently, they are mostly British and American.

Anaklia has seen the withdrawal of the Chinese-led consortium and is moving towards a government-run model. To what extent is the project reliant on Chinese cargo to succeed?

I would separate two issues: Chinese participation in developing the port and Chinese cargo using the port. They are not necessarily linked. China is extremely important to the Middle Corridor because of the scale of its manufacturing base and its role as a major origin of Eurasian container traffic. Chinese-origin cargo will be important to Anaklia’s long-term commercial potential. But I would not build the business case solely around Chinese cargo.

A successful deep-sea port should have a diversified cargo base. China, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, regional Black Sea markets and European-bound cargo can all contribute. The port should serve whichever flows are commercially competitive. The withdrawal of a Chinese-led consortium does not mean Chinese cargo will disappear. Cargo follows the route offering the best combination of cost, capacity, reliability and transit time, not the nationality of the infrastructure investor. The more important question is whether Anaklia can secure shipping-line relationships, competitive port operations and sufficient hinterland connectivity to create a genuine cargo ecosystem.

Given climate change and its impact on the Caspian Sea, how likely is it that Anaklia will become a major trade artery for Central Asia?

Changing Caspian water levels are a real issue. They affect vessel drafts, port operations, cargo intake and the reliability of the maritime section between Central Asia and Azerbaijan. However, this does not make Anaklia’s strategic role irrelevant. The Caspian is one section of the wider corridor. Anaklia sits on the western end, on the Black Sea. If Caspian conditions constrain cargo from Kazakhstan or other Central Asian markets, that is primarily a constraint on the eastern part of the corridor rather than on the value of additional deep-water capacity in Georgia. This reinforces the point that the Middle Corridor is a network of interconnected infrastructure.

For Anaklia to become a major gateway for Central Asian cargo, the entire chain must function: Caspian shipping, Azerbaijani infrastructure, rail and road capacity, Georgian rail and port operations and onward Black Sea services. Anaklia’s potential is significant, but its success depends on the performance of the entire corridor rather than the port alone.

How much and what kind of investment in onshore infrastructure would be required for Anaklia to be viable?

A port does not operate in isolation. Building the quay and dredging the harbour is only part of the investment. For commercial success, Anaklia needs efficient railway and road connections, customs infrastructure, container handling, warehouses, logistics facilities, equipment, digital systems and a broader intermodal ecosystem. The real investment case is not simply the port; it is the port plus its hinterland. Anaklia requires dry terminals, railways and road connections. The gold standard would include an airport nearby. While an airport seems unlikely, the rest of the ecosystem is being delivered. The plan is for Anaklia to be operational by 2029. Not everything will be in place, but enough infrastructure will be in place to begin operations and expand incrementally.

Foreign investment will ultimately be important. A project of this scale benefits from capital, international terminal expertise, shipping relationships, cargo networks and operational know-how. But the project does not depend on one foreign investor financing and operating everything. A landlord-port model allows the state to retain ownership of core infrastructure while international operators and private investors participate in different parts of the ecosystem.

Would Anaklia Compete with Poti, or Are They Complementary?

The two ports are close to each other. They should be regarded primarily as complementary, especially if Middle Corridor volumes continue to grow. Poti already has something extremely valuable: an established operating ecosystem, existing customers, shipping connections, logistics companies and cargo flows. Anaklia brings deeper water and the ability to accommodate larger vessels and provide long-term capacity. It can host ships Poti cannot, attracting cargo that currently bypasses Georgia. Georgia will no longer rely solely on transhipment from larger neighbouring ports. Vessels carrying 50,000–70,000 tonnes can be a gamechanger in terms of cost.

There will be competition between the ports for specific cargo and services. This is not negative. Competition improves efficiency and service quality. But the strategic question is not Poti versus Anaklia. It is Georgia versus alternative regional corridors. If regional East–West cargo volumes grow, having both an established port and a new deep-water facility gives Georgia greater capacity, flexibility and resilience. The future of the South Caucasus logistics network is not about one corridor replacing another. It is becoming more interconnected and competitive, with different routes serving different cargo flows.

Assuming customs issues can be addressed, TRIPP can become part of this system. Armenia can develop into a complementary connector. Azerbaijan remains critical for Caspian connectivity. Türkiye provides access to the Mediterranean and European markets. Georgia can continue to serve as a major Black Sea gateway. From a logistics perspective, cargo carriers make the final decision. Cargo moves along the route that delivers the right combination of cost, reliability, capacity and time.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis for Caucasus Watch