Russia’s Economic Influence in Georgia Remains Significant in Energy and Traditional Exports

| News, Economy, Georgia

Russia’s economic influence on Georgia has declined in some areas since its peak following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but significant dependencies remain in energy supplies and traditional export markets, according to published on 10 November. The analysis examines foreign trade, remittances, tourism, foreign investment and energy relations between 2021 and September 2026. One indicator combining revenues from exports to Russia, Russian tourism and remittances fell from 14.4% of Georgia’s nominal GDP in 2022 to 5% in 2025, below the 6.2% recorded in 2021. The decline was largely driven by falling remittances, which dropped from $2.07 billion in 2022 to $468 million in 2025.

Trade data show that Georgia’s imports from Russia have increased considerably. In 2025, bilateral trade turnover reached $2.69 billion, with Georgian exports amounting to $749.3 million and imports from Russia reaching $1.94 billion. Although Russia’s share of Georgia’s total exports declined from 14.4% in 2021 to 10.3% in 2025, its share of domestically produced exports increased from 17.7% to 20.8%. Russia remains particularly important for traditional Georgian products: in 2025, it accounted for approximately 64% of Georgian wine exports and 56% of alcoholic beverage exports. During January-September 2026, approximately 91% of Georgia’s exported blueberries also went to Russia. However, Russia’s share of domestic exports fell to 13.9% during the same period, as exports to other markets expanded, particularly to China, which overtook Russia as Georgia’s largest domestic export market.

Energy remains one of the areas where dependence on Russia has increased most visibly. Between 2021 and 2025, natural gas imports from Russia grew 2.2 times, from 397 million to 886 million cubic metres, raising Russia’s share of Georgia’s gas supplies from 15.3% to 27.9%. Azerbaijan nevertheless remained the largest supplier, accounting for 71.7% of gas supplies in 2025. Russia also accounted for 62.4% of Georgia’s electricity imports in 2025, although approximately 74.5% of the electricity imported from Russia was used to supply occupied Abkhazia. In the oil sector, the Kulevi refinery initially processed Russian crude but reportedly switched to non-Russian supplies from August 2026, with Kazakhstan and Libya identified as alternative suppliers.

Russia’s importance in remittances and tourism has also changed. Transfers from Russia fell to $468 million in 2025, approximately 77% below their 2022 peak, while January-September 2026 remittances declined by a further 11.5% year-on-year to $304.8 million. Russian citizens nevertheless remained the largest group of international visitors to Georgia, making 1.58 million visits in 2025 and 1.31 million in the first nine months of 2026. Yet, Russia’s share of Georgia’s international travel revenue declined from 25.3% in 2022 to 14.8% in 2025. Russian foreign direct investment also represents a relatively small share of overall investment, falling from 6.8% in 2021 to 5.8% in 2025. In the first half of 2026, Russian investment decreased by 33.5% year-on-year to $37.2 million, with approximately 85% concentrated in real estate and construction.

The study concludes that declining Russian revenue flows do not necessarily translate into reduced economic vulnerability. Georgia remains exposed to potential changes in Russian energy supplies and restrictions on access to the Russian market, particularly for wine and other traditional agricultural products. Previous Russian trade embargoes have demonstrated the potential economic consequences of such restrictions. The analysis therefore highlights export-market diversification and alternative energy suppliers as important factors in reducing Georgia’s exposure to economic pressure from Russia.

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