What role, if any, can the European Union play in implementing the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) Agreement signed on August 8, 2025? That question is the starting point of this interview with Marina Ohanjanyan, Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute.

Often described as the Dutch equivalent of Chatham House, Clingendael is the Netherlands’ leading institute for international relations and strategic policy, with a proven track record of shaping both national and EU-level decision-making. In her September 25, 2025, report, “Peace or Pause? The TRIPP Agreement and Europe’s Missing Seat,” Ohanjanyan explores the conditions under which the Washington-brokered deal may require EU support.

Her central argument is that although the European Union was excluded from the negotiation table, it retains a unique opportunity to shape implementation—provided it can secure U.S. consent. The TRIPP framework promises transit, reconciliation, and peacebuilding. Its core compromise—granting Azerbaijani access to Nakhichevan via Armenian territory—is to be managed by U.S. private firms under Armenian jurisdiction. However, the agreement lacks robust enforcement mechanisms and leaves key regulatory questions unresolved.

While Brussels was sidelined during negotiations, Washington may still look to the EU for support in the technical and administrative dimensions of implementation. In this conversation, Caucasus Watch explores with Marina Ohanjanyan how Brussels might enter the picture—not as a guarantor, but as a pragmatic facilitator. From infrastructure investment to harmonizing customs regimes, the EU’s potential contribution depends on the consent of all three signatories: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States.

Before diving into the TRIPP architecture and the prenuptial agreement signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, could you walk us through what led to August 8? What makes this moment different from previous efforts?

Several documents were signed in August, but the peace agreement itself wasn’t new. It had already been announced in March—17 points agreed upon—but progress stalled due to a number of obstacles, mostly demands from Azerbaijan. One of the most difficult issues was the corridor or route linking mainland Azerbaijan to the exclave of Nakhichevan. Azerbaijan wanted a direct connection without Armenian oversight. Sources suggest the end goal is driving from Baku to Nakhichevan without a single stop.

So, the breakthrough wasn’t the peace agreement itself, but the formula for resolving the corridor issue?

Exactly. The compromise was to inject U.S. private companies as intermediaries—managing transit under Armenian jurisdiction. It’s not extraterritorial, but it’s still unclear how this will work in practice.

Given Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, how does TRIPP navigate divergent customs regimes? What does this mean for corridor governance and third-party investors?

That’s the real question. Armenia’s customs procedures are aligned with the Eurasian Union, which has its own outer borders and internal rules. Azerbaijan isn’t part of that system, yet it’s now getting a kind of free pass. Russia has already flagged procedural concerns, though it hasn’t taken a clear stance. Their relationship with Azerbaijan was strained—especially after the downing of an Azerbaijani airliner—but Putin’s apology may signal a reset. Russia could still become a stumbling block, but it’s possible it hasn’t decided on this yet.

That leads us to the 99-year clause and inclusive development rights. How is this perceived in Armenia and Azerbaijan? Does it raise concerns about sovereignty or strategic dependency?

Surprisingly, this specific point hasn’t sparked as much public debate in Armenia as other parts of the agreement. I think that’s because the alternative was worse—Russian FSB agents managing the road. Armenia clearly rejected that. Azerbaijan wouldn’t accept Armenian control either. The EU was floated as a neutral intermediary, but that didn’t fly with Baku. So the U.S. became the least objectionable option. In Azerbaijan, it’s harder to gauge sentiment, but both sides seem reluctant to irritate Trump. I suspect pressure from Washington helped push this through.

In your policy paper, you introduce the idea of EU leverage without a seat at the table. How do you see the EU’s entry point?

The EU is trying to position itself. You see statements from EU ambassadors and other officials about readiness to invest and partner. But the key is getting U.S. consent. That might be difficult. Washington holds the leverage. The EU’s best chance is technical involvement – boring minutiae like administration and regulatory harmonisation – and, potentially, financial support. If U.S. attention wanes, EU engagement becomes more realistic. But right now, I don’t see strong incentives for Washington to let Brussels in, or very public signs that it is planning to do so. But talks and discussions may very well be ongoing behind the scenes.

Could an EU company join the consortium managing the corridor? Or could the European Commission take on a regulatory work package?

Possibly either. I’ve heard that European rail technology is more compatible with what’s on the ground than American systems. That could be an entry point. But even if a European company is involved, you’d still need political backing to resolve regulatory differences between Yerevan and Baku. So yes, the EU could enter through the private sector, but it would still need political capital to make that role meaningful.

Do you see either Washington or Brussels investing real political energy in this?

On the U.S. side, it’s hard to say. There have been some customs visits and meetings, but progress is slower than hoped. Trump has been distracted by Gaza and Ukraine. On the EU side, there’s more political will—especially with Armenia—but I’m not sure there’s a clear strategy. The Global Gateway framework seems like a good vehicle, but Brussels would still be playing second fiddle unless Washington steps back.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis