The “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)” is a proposed transit corridor linking mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan through southern Armenia’s Syunik province. Most regional analysts have been referring to this vision as the “Zangezur Corridor,” a term that is likely to retain currency. In substance, the agreement remains bilaterally framed between Yerevan and Baku. However, the fact that this agreement was announced in Washington on August 8, 2025, is not inconsequential.

In diplomatic briefings, the Armenian side had for months considered a more neutral framework that would involve Swiss corporations. The current framework stipulates that the U.S. has leasing rights over the corridor, effectively managing its infrastructure and security. Washington’s involvement was perceived to offer additional diplomatic weight that goes beyond facilitation and approximates substantive mediation. Overall, the U.S. is known to have been investing in the broader project of Trans-Eurasian connectivity (the Middle Corridor), which includes the 43km Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan segment. U.S. capital is already channeled into the Middle Corridor via the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the World Bank.

Control over this section of the corridor could possibly facilitate further U.S. investment, with American security firms contributing to a “de-risking” strategy. The security dimension raises the question of how Iran will react. Tehran has articulated its opposition to the corridor. In fact, there is a threat of military action. The Senior Adviser to the Supreme Leader, Ali Akbar Velayati, threatened that “the area will become a graveyard for Trump’s mercenaries.” Given Iran’s sensitivity to U.S. military presence, the presence of contractors with a track record in Iraq and Afghanistan could provoke a backlash. Significantly, the 12-day war between Iran and Israel that began on June 13—with direct U.S. involvement—heightens sensitivities, particularly regarding foreign military presence. Iran’s reaction is regionally significant, as the country has meaningful relationships with Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia.

To better understand Iran’s position, Caucasus Watch reached out to Vali Golmohammadi. Professor Golmohammadi is a South Caucasus expert and the Head of the International Relations Department of Tarbiat Modares University, a Visiting Professor at the Supreme National Defence University (Tehran), and a non-resident fellow at the Institute for Political and International Studies of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

How is the recent Azerbaijani-Armenian agreement for the creation of the so-called “peace corridor” being interpreted in Tehran? Is U.S. involvement in creating the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” perceived as technical facilitation or substantive regional engagement?

In Tehran, the Azerbaijani-Armenian agreement on establishing a so-called “peace corridor” is being interpreted with caution, primarily through the lens of sovereignty concerns and the regional balance of power. Iranian officials are wary that a land corridor connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Armenia’s Syunik province could marginalize Iran’s role as a regional transit hub, while also potentially altering geopolitical alignments to its disadvantage.

The U.S. involvement, branded as the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” is not perceived in Tehran as mere technical facilitation but rather as substantive geopolitical engagement. Iran views such initiatives as part of Washington’s broader strategy to reduce Tehran’s influence in the South Caucasus and to strengthen ties between U.S.-aligned regional actors, particularly Turkey and Azerbaijan.

In the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War (2020), the region has witnessed a pronounced shift in its security architecture, characterized by the consolidation of a strategic axis among Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Israel. This emerging alignment, manifested through deepening military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and energy partnerships, appears to be increasingly nested within a broader Euro-Atlantic strategy of influence in the region. For Iran, these developments signify more than a localized rearrangement of power. Instead, Tehran interprets them as part of a systematic, Western-led encirclement strategy aimed at containing Iran's strategic depth and influence, alongside that of China and Russia.

How would this new corridor affect regional connectivity, and what are the perceived economic implications for Iran? President Pezeshkian had downplayed the significance of the corridor.

The new corridor could significantly enhance regional connectivity by linking Azerbaijan with Turkey, thereby facilitating East-West trade flows across the South Caucasus while bypassing Iranian territory. Economically, this development is seen in Tehran as a potential threat to Iran’s own north-south transit ambitions and its long-term aspiration to be a key bridge in Eurasian trade networks.

While President Masoud Pezeshkian has publicly underplayed the significance of the corridor, perhaps to avoid escalating tensions or appearing confrontational, Iranian observers, including the security apparatus, have highlighted that the corridor could undermine Iran’s leverage in regional trade, weaken its role in initiatives like the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and reduce much-needed transit revenues.

In what ways does this agreement challenge the diplomatic status quo for Iran, particularly in its diplomatic and security relations with Armenia?

The agreement poses a challenge to Iran’s diplomatic status quo by straining its traditionally close relations with Armenia, which Tehran has long supported as a counterbalance to Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation. Armenia’s potential acquiescence to the corridor could reduce Tehran’s influence in Yerevan while simultaneously complicating Iran’s balancing strategy between the two Caucasus rivals. Moreover, the shift undermines Iran’s security assurances to Armenia, potentially diminishing Tehran’s credibility as a reliable partner and creating space for other powers—such as the EU and the U.S.—to play a more dominant role in mediating South Caucasus affairs.

What does the agreement signify for Iran’s relationship with Turkey?

For Iran’s relationship with Turkey, the corridor crystallizes a structural dilemma: it deepens the Ankara–Baku strategic alignment—formalized since the 2021 Shusha Declaration and increasingly nested in the Organization of Turkic States and the “Middle Corridor” rail-energy-logistics spine—while simultaneously obliging Tehran to preserve functional interdependence with a neighbor that remains vital for trade and energy flows.

On the competitive side, the corridor (together with capacity upgrades on the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway and planned TANAP expansions) accelerates a westward Turkic connectivity arc that bypasses Iranian territory and erodes Tehran’s transit revenues and bargaining leverage over Turkey. The new Iğdır–Nakhichevan gas link, which started operating in 2025, also reduces Nakhichevan’s historic dependence on Iranian supply and tightens the Turkey–Azerbaijan energy loop at Iran’s doorstep. At the same time, Turkey is methodically diversifying away from Iranian gas—expanding TANAP/TAP volumes and signing long-term LNG deals—just as the BOTAŞ–NIGC pipeline contract approaches its July 2026 expiration, a timetable that increases Ankara’s leverage in renewal talks and underscores for Tehran that the corridor is embedded in a broader Turkish gas-hub strategy rather than a stand-alone transit project.

Security externalities compound the challenge: from Iran’s perspective, a denser Azerbaijan–Turkey land bridge risks facilitating Israeli intelligence reach along its northwestern frontier, a long-standing anxiety that has sharpened since Baku’s battlefield gains and deeper defense ties with Israel. Yet this same map also creates incentives for recalibration. Iran’s leaders have actively promoted the alternative “Aras Corridor” via Iranian territory (Aghband–Ordubad bridges and rail), signaling a willingness to channel east–west flows through Iran as a safety valve that preserves Armenia’s border integrity while giving Turkey and Azerbaijan redundancy. If realized, that routing would partially convert a zero-sum dynamic into managed interdependence, while complementing Iran’s North–South ambitions on the INSTC.

Finally, because Turkey remains a top-tier economic counterpart with two-way trade measured in the low-tens of billions of dollars and political aims to lift it further, Tehran is likely to pair deterrence (red lines on border changes, counter-intelligence vigilance, and military signaling along the Aras) with pragmatic cooperation (energy swaps, contract renewal on more favorable terms, and inclusion in corridor governance) to avoid strategic marginalization. In short, the agreement sharpens rivalry but also creates a policy aperture for Iran to bargain its way back into the regional connectivity architecture rather than be locked out of it.

Under what conditions would Iran consider a more assertive posture to defend its interests? What factors might influence Tehran’s security calculus in the Syunik region?

Iran would consider adopting a more assertive posture if the corridor arrangement were to threaten its territorial sovereignty, diminish its geoeconomic role in Eurasian transit, or enable a broader encirclement strategy by adversarial powers. Factors influencing Tehran’s security calculus in the Syunik region include the risk of foreign military presence, the empowerment of pan-Turkic regional networks, and the possible exclusion of Iran from regional energy and transport projects. Tehran’s red lines appear centered on ensuring that the corridor does not undermine Armenian sovereignty in ways that compromise Iranian border security or unfavorably reshape its geostrategic environment.

The convergence of perceived threats would catalyze a notable shift in Iran's regional posture. Formerly characterized by diplomatic, cultural, and economic engagement in the Caucasus, Iran's approach would shift toward securitization and defensive recalibration. This includes an increasingly visible role for Iran’s armed forces, a reorientation of defense priorities, and the framing of the Caucasus as a potential frontline in a broader geostrategic contest.

Azerbaijani television recently reported a disruption in the flow of trucks from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan. How should one interpret this incident?

This report should be viewed primarily as a psychological operation aimed at exerting diplomatic pressure on Iran, rather than as a reflection of tangible developments on the ground. The intention appears to be to discourage Tehran from adopting a firm or retaliatory stance in response to the so-called “Trump Route” initiative.

Historically, Iran has consistently maintained a safe, stable, and open route for Azerbaijani transit trucks en route to Nakhchivan, without any politically motivated or non-technical impediments. This reported incident undermines the perception of Iran’s reliability as a transit partner in the region. It is also noteworthy that no credible international news outlets have substantiated these claims. The reports have predominantly circulated through Azerbaijani-affiliated sources, suggesting that the narrative is being advanced with particular political objectives rather than being grounded in factual developments.

Where does the Caucasus fit in terms of strategic priorities for Iran? How does it compare with other regions in the country’s neighborhood, like Syria or the Gulf, particularly amid a national security crisis? Would you say this is a second- or third-order priority at the moment?

The Caucasus occupies a mid-tier position in Iran’s hierarchy of strategic priorities, ranking below the Persian Gulf and the Levant but still above peripheral theaters such as Central Asia and Afghanistan. While the Persian Gulf remains central due to energy security and rivalry with the U.S. and its Arab allies, and the Levant and Iraq are vital as part of Iran’s forward defense strategy against Israel, the South Caucasus matters more for Iran’s border security, transit ambitions, and ethnic sensitivities.

Given Iran’s ongoing national security concerns, the Caucasus should be considered a second-order rather than a third-order priority: not existential in the short term, but sufficiently crucial that developments there can reshape Iran’s geostrategic environment if ignored. As the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus continues to evolve, Iran’s Caucasus policy has been somewhat reactive, trying to counter moves by Turkey and Azerbaijan rather than setting its own agenda. The rapid changes in regional geopolitics appear to have caught Tehran off guard, especially considering that Iran had relied on the old Russia-dominated order in the region as serving its interests. With the old order gradually unraveling and other actors, including Turkey, Israel, European powers, and the US, playing a more decisive role, Tehran is facing increasing challenges.

Geographically, Iran is more affected by developments in the South Caucasus than Turkey, Russia, or Georgia. Iran has an 800-kilometer-long border in the region, which leaves it vulnerable to potential local conflicts. It is also the only country adjacent to the conflict zone in Nagorno-Karabakh. This leaves Iran in a delicate situation: the traditional balancing act between Armenia and Azerbaijan appears to be ineffective, as siding with Armenia in an effort to rebuild the power balance in the region is fraught with the risk of further escalation and uncertainty in Iran’s fragile relations with Azerbaijan.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis for Caucasus Watch